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Abstract 
 
This paper examines shareholder wealth effects of cross-border acquisitions. In a sample of 
155 large acquisitions by German corporations from 1985–2006 international transactions in 
total do not lead to significant announcement returns. Geography, however, makes a differ-
ence: Shareholders of acquiring firms gain 6.5% in cross-border transactions into countries 
that have a common border with Germany but lose 4.4% in other international transactions. 
We find proximity to be one of the most important success factors in cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions, even when we control for firm, deal and country characteristics. 
 1  Introduction 
Cross-border acquisitions are en vogue. In 2006, four of the ten largest European deals 
have been cross-border (Thomson Financial 2007). Whether these transactions create 
value, however, is an open issue. This paper analyses a sample of 155 acquisitions of public 
German firms between 1985 and 2006 of which 115 are cross-border and 40 are domestic 
acquisitions. We do not find that international diversification increases shareholder value 
for German acquiring firms: In a [-20; +20] day window around announcement of the deal 
firms acquiring internationally face a share price reaction of -2.21% whereas shareholders 
of firms that acquire domestically get an increase of +0.66%. Due to large variations in the 
results between firms these figures are neither significantly different from zero nor from 
each other. We further analyse cross-border acquisitions separately using univariate and 
multivariate regressions. We find proximity to Germany to be a decisive variable for 
acquisition success. Acquisitions in countries that have a common border with Germany 
lead to an average abnormal return of +6.54% for the acquirer’s share price (though not 
statistically different from zero) whereas acquisitions in all other countries lead to a 
significant decrease of -4.38%, again in a [-20; +20] day window. The returns of the two 
groups are statistically different and economically very relevant. When we control for a 
variety of deal, firm and country characteristics the common border effect remains positive 
and significant.  
Scientific evidence on the reactions of European acquiring firms’ share prices in the course 
of cross-border M&A transactions is still scarce. The few existing studies mostly focus on 
the UK, though some of them also include other European countries (e.g. Lowinski et al. 
2004). To our knowledge this is the first study to analyse acquirer returns in international 
transactions with regard to different regions. We document that proximity between 
acquirer and target is an important driver for the success of international transactions. 
Better integration and monitoring possibilities of closer targets, as well as knowledge about 
‘soft facts’, culture and language are possible reasons that might be responsible for this 
result. The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 provides an overview of theoretical 
considerations regarding cross-border M&A. Section 3 explains the selection of data and 
the methodology applied in order to analyse shareholder wealth effects of German 
international acquisitions. Section 4 presents the analysis, and section 5 concludes. 
 
2  Theoretical considerations  
Buying foreign firms instead of domestic ones theoretically yields benefits and costs. A 
positive cross-border effect should lead to a more favourable reaction of the acquirer’s 
share price for international compared to domestic deals. Positive cross-border effects can 
be derived from several arguments, as can be negative effects. Our analysis basically sets up 
a horse race between the two classes of arguments.    2
Multinational companies can be viewed as portfolios of internationally diversified assets 
(Fatemi 1984). Portfolio theory argues that investors should hold well diversified portfolios 
to maximise their risk-adjusted returns. In perfectly integrated and competitive capital, 
goods and services markets, the announcement of a cross-border deal should not yield 
higher returns to shareholders than the announcement of a national transaction. When 
there are restrictions to international capital flows, however, the picture changes. Informal 
barriers on international capital markets, such as taxes, minimum holding periods or, most 
importantly, information gaps are still important hindrances for diversification (Markides 
and Ittner 1994; Coval and Moskowitz 1999; Hau 2001, Stulz 2005). Thus multinational 
corporations might offer a valuable service to investors by enabling them to diversify their 
holdings internationally. Dunning (1993) theorizes that operational benefits via the 
exploitation of firm- and country-specific advantages are major reasons for the existence of 
multinational firms. Firms must be able to employ their assets more economically abroad 
than in their home market because the target market provides the firm with advantages 
exclusive to that location, e.g. lower production costs, special infrastructure or an especially 
skilled workforce (the ‘location’ factor, see Teece 1986). Firms that operate on international 
scale are able to shift resources from one market to another within their network. Through 
cross-border acquisitions, they acquire important knowledge about how to produce, 
customize or market goods and services for foreign and their domestic market (Doukas 
and Travlos 1988). Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) find that cross-border acquisitions are 
more likely and more frequent than domestic acquisitions in R&D intensive industries. 
Morck and Yeung (1992) show that bidder gains in foreign acquisitions are positively 
associated with acquirers’ spending on research and development. Finally, firms might just 
exploit lower costs and wages in other countries. In such scenarios we would on average 
expect higher valuations for internationally diversified firms. Empirical research about the 
long-term advantages of internationally diversified firms is mixed, though. Errunza and 
Senbet (1981) find a positive relation between international involvement and excess market 
value of US companies. Denis et al. (2002) report that international diversification leads to 
a diversification discount similar to that of industrial diversification. 
There is also evidence that international diversification may lead to inefficiencies and thus 
impose considerable costs on the companies. Berger and Ofek (1995) state that especially 
in the case of industry diversification there may be value-destroying cross-subsidies within 
organisations. In the case of international diversification this is occasionally observed when 
operating profits derived from the home market are used to support ailing foreign 
operations that were recently acquired. Doukas and Travlos (1988) point out that 
international operations might be associated with higher monitoring and bonding costs 
than domestic activities. Grote and Umber (2007) find that transaction success decreases 
significantly with increasing distance even for domestic acquisitions in the US. They show, 
however, a non-monotonic relationship between distance and success. The best deals are 
not those that take place in close proximity – the best deals occur when the targets are   3
about 500 kilometres away from the  acquirers’ headquarters and only after that 
the results get worse. Translated into an international setting we would expect deals in 
more distant countries to deliver worse results than transactions into closer countries. 
Additionally the integration of newly acquired foreign operations can be a substantial 
challenge for the acquirer: this refers to the ‘clash of cultures’ observed in some cross-
border acquisitions where there is virtually no cooperation but in fact rivalry and 
entrenchment between the acquirer and the newly acquired business. Such problems can 
make cross-border acquisitions a threat for the functioning of the entire corporation. 
Whether the benefits or costs of international diversification prevail is essentially an 
empirical question that we address in this paper.  
The literature about wealth effects of domestic mergers and acquisitions has established 
two major facts. First, returns to target firm shareholders are on average significantly 
positive; e.g., Mulherin and Boone (2000) and Schwert (1996) find an average cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) for the targets’ shares of more than 20%. Second, for bidding firm 
shareholders, announcement returns from mergers and acquisitions are often slightly 
negative and regularly not significantly different from zero (e.g., Franks et al. 1991; 
Andrade et al. 2001; Healy et al. 1992). The results obtained for domestic bidder returns do 
not necessarily have to be valid for cross-border deals if one or all of the benefits and costs 
explained in the paragraphs above are reflected in acquirer returns. Doukas and Travlos 
(1988) find no significant impact from cross-border acquisitions on acquirer returns for 
US-firms expanding abroad. They find, however, positive and significant returns for firms 
that are already multinational and enter a new foreign market for the first time. They also 
find acquirer returns to be highest when entering less developed and economically less 
correlated countries with respect to the USA. Eun et al. (1996) find that foreign bidders 
acquiring US targets experience negative and significant announcement returns on average. 
Their results, however, differ significantly between acquirer countries. Over the period 
1979-1990, Japanese acquirers earn significantly positive returns whereas British acquirers 
earn significantly negative returns. Acquirer returns for French, German and Dutch firms 
are not statistically significant on conventional levels. Kang (1993) studies acquisitions of 
US companies by Japanese firms and finds significantly positive announcement returns for 
the acquirers. Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) find mostly negative but insignificant returns for 
US firms that acquire Canadian targets. Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) present results 
for US acquirers. They find a significantly negative cross-border effect, i.e. bidder firms that 
engage in cross-border deals experience significantly lower announcement results than 
firms acquiring domestic targets. This trend appears to be more stable in recent years, 
which may reflect a higher degree of sophistication and integration of international capital 
markets.  
For continental Europe the available evidence is limited. Goergen and Renneboog (2004) 
analyse large European takeover bids and find a positive and significant announcement   4
returns for cross-border acquirers; the results turn insignificant for larger event windows. 
For German, Austrian and Swiss bidders, the announcement returns are negative and 
insignificant in most event windows. In contrast, Lowinski et al. (2004) study Swiss firms 
that expand abroad and find positive and significant CARs for acquirers. Bühner (1992) 
examines a sample of 39 cross-border acquisitions of German firms between 1973 and 
1987. Based on the event window [-24; +24] months, his results indicate that CARs of 
cross-border acquisitions are higher than those of domestic deals in the mid term. The 
second study aiming explicitly at German firms by Gerke et al. (1995) finds no significant 
results for acquirers; the study, however, does not control for factors other than the target 
country. Altogether, the results suggest that the geographic scope of acquisitions can have 
significant impact on announcement returns for acquirers. However, many of the results 
are insignificant at conventional levels and even the signs of the abnormal returns differ 
between studies. Hence, there is no convincing general evidence about shareholder wealth 
effects in cross-border acquisitions so far.  
 
3  Data and methodology 
3.1  Data 
The study is based on acquisitions by German firms between 1985 and 2006 that are 
reported in the Thomson Financial SDC database. We exclude non-completed deals; deals 
where the bidder is a private, government-owned or joint venture company and 
transactions involving less than 50% of the target’s shares. We further eliminate deals with 
insufficient data availability and also – following Dewenter (1995) and Lowinski et al. 
(2004) – drop transactions where data for the estimation window of [-220; -21] is not 
available. In line with the literature we concentrate on non-financial acquirers and therefore 
exclude banks, private equity and real estate firms, and insurance companies from our 
sample. To ensure that the transactions have an impact on the acquirer’s share prices we 
exclude all deals with an unknown value or where the deal value is lower than EUR 100 
million. Our final sample for the event study includes 155 deals.  
Graph 1 displays the frequency and volume distribution over time. M&A activity moves 
alongside the general stock market development: The correlation coefficient for the 
rebased C-DAX vs. the number of announced deals is 0.84 (0.85 for the volume of 
transactions).    5
    Graph 1: Number and volume of German  M&A transactions per year 
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While the market and M&A volume development between 1985 and 1993 has no clear 
direction, the period 1994-2000 is characterized by steady increases in stock prices and in 
M&A activity. The transaction volume reaches a peak in 2000 with a total of EUR 55.38 
billion (pushed by the EUR 30.78 billion acquisition of Voicestream Wireless by Deutsche 
Telekom). The stock market decline in 2000-2002 is accompanied by decreasing M&A 
volumes. From 2004–2006, stock market levels rise again and so do M&A deals and 
volumes. Lowinski et al. (2004) derive a similar pattern for Swiss firms.  
Table 1 displays the distribution of the sample according to target countries. 35.5% of all 
acquisitions and 44.0% of deal value are derived from acquisitions of US companies, 
followed by 25.8% and 18.5%, respectively, for German targets. The UK ranks third and 
accounts for 13.5% of total deals and 23.9% of total deal value. It is remarkable that 34.2% 
of the deals involve targets from European countries other than Germany so that only 
4.5% of all transactions (i.e., six deals) take place in regions outside the US and Europe. 
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Table 1: Target countries
Target 
country
No. of 
deals
% of 
total 
deals
Transaction 
value (in mill. 
EUR)
% of 
total 
value
USA 55 35,5% 123.283 44,0%
Germany 40 25,8% 51.946 18,5%
United Kingdom 21 13,5% 67.087 23,9%
Switzerland 8 5,2% 11.426 4,1%
France 8 5,2% 10.451 3,7%
Sweden 6 3,9% 7.459 2,7%
Denmark 2 1,3% 2.580 0,9%
Canada 2 1,3% 1.318 0,5%
Belgium 2 1,3% 1.107 0,4%
Italy 2 1,3% 273 0,1%
Slovak Republic 1 0,6% 1.000 0,4%
South Korea 1 0,6% 550 0,2%
Chile 1 0,6% 388 0,1%
Netherlands 1 0,6% 368 0,1%
Poland 1 0,6% 366 0,1%
Finland 1 0,6% 240 0,1%
India 1 0,6% 208 0,1%
Portugal 1 0,6% 182 0,1%
Australia 1 0,6% 115 0,0%
Sum 155 100% 280.348 100%
 
Due to the exclusion of deals with a value below EUR 100 million, EUR 101 million is the 
minimum transaction value. The largest deal in the sample is the acquisition of Chrysler by 
Daimler-Benz in 1998 with about EUR 36.3 billion. The average transaction has a volume 
of EUR 1,809 million with 94.4% of the target shares acquired. Industrials, materials, 
energy and power are the most active acquirer industries, accounting for 56.1% of all deals 
and 57.0% of deal value. Due to a few large deals the average deal value is by far the 
highest in the telecom sector followed by healthcare. We consider the ‘relatedness’ of 
acquisitions as a potential driver of acquisition success and therefore compare the standard 
industry classification (SIC) codes of target and acquirer. Following Doukas and Travlos 
(1988) and Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) we classify companies that share the first two digits 
of their primary SIC codes as ‘related’. To check for misspecifications in the Thomson 
Financial database we screen all deals’ primary SIC codes and macro industry codes, and 
verify those classifications on the companies’ web pages. After that we classify 71.6% of 
the deals as related, representing 85.3% of total deal value.  
The 40 deals with German targets are classified as domestic deals and the remaining 115 as 
cross-border deals. The cross-border deals have an average volume of EUR 1,986 million   7
and are about EUR 700 million larger than domestic acquisitions with an average of 
EUR 1,298 million. Table 2 presents characteristics of the sample according to the type of 
acquisition, i.e. domestic or cross-border.  
Table 2: Deal characteristics by type of acquisition
Deal criteria Cross 
border 
deals (1)
Domestic 
deals (2)
(1) - (2) Entire 
sample
Number of observations 115 40 75 155
Average bidder size (in mill. EUR) 19.798 15.114 4.684 18.589
Average deal size (in mill. EUR) 1.986 1.299 687 1.809
Average bidder profitability 13,76% 13,42% 0,34% 13,67%
Average bidder R&D / sales 3,82% 1,50% 2,32% 3,23%
Average bidder cash / total assets 11,51% 11,76% -0,25% 11,57%
Related deals 73,04% 67,50% 5,54% 71,61%
Cash payments 74,78% 75,00% -0,22% 74,84%
Hostile deals 2,61% 0,00% 2,61% 1,94%
Competed deals 2,61% 5,00% -2,39% 3,23%
Public targets 35,65% 20,00% 15,65% 31,61%
 
Bidders in cross-border acquisitions are on average EUR 4,684 million larger than domestic 
bidders and the targets they acquire are EUR 687 million larger than those of domestic 
bidders. Although cross-border acquirers are only slightly more profitable than domestic 
bidders, they invest substantially more in R&D (3.82% of sales vs. 1.50% of sales), lending 
some support for the internalization hypothesis (Harris and Ravenscraft 1991). Moreover, 
cross-border acquirers make more related acquisitions and they more frequently acquire 
public targets. Note that there are only few hostile and competed deals in the sample, in 
line with Rossi and Volpin (2004).  
 
3.2  Methodology 
We apply an event study methodology to determine abnormal returns to acquirers’ share 
prices in the trading days around announcement. We assume that capital markets are 
efficient in the semi-strong form, incorporating publicly available information into security 
prices more or less instantaneously. In a first step we determine whether abnormal returns 
of cross-border and domestic transactions are significantly different from zero. We then 
analyse whether returns of domestic acquirers are significantly different from those of 
companies that acquire in foreign countries. We measure abnormal returns as the 
difference between observed return and expected return (see Brown and Warner 1980). 
For the estimation of expected returns we use a market model with logarithmic returns and 
the German C-DAX as benchmark index. The C-DAX is a market value-weighted index 
that contains all German listed companies. Following Kang (1993) we estimate the market   8
model parameters using an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression from 220 trading 
days to 21 trading days before the announcement date. Although the market model is a 
relatively simple model for the estimation of expected returns, it has proved to be quite 
accurate in comparison with more sophisticated methods (see Conn and Connell 1990; 
Brown and Warner 1980).  
We estimate cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over different event windows. Positive 
average CARs indicate that the acquisitions create value for the acquiring firms’ 
shareholders. We test the significance of the average CARs with a two-tailed t-test with the 
null hypothesis that  ] ; [ 2 1 t t CAR  is equal to zero. Since the t-test assumes a normal 
distribution we additionally perform non-parametric tests. We then use several multivariate 
regressions to determine and control for factors that influence abnormal returns. The cross 
sectional regressions follow a simple multiple OLS regression model as in, e.g., Franks and 
Harris (1989): 
i n n t t i x x x CAR ε β β β α + + + + + = ... 2 2 1 1 0 ] ; [ 2 1  
where α0 is the intercept; β1 is the coefficient for the regression variable x1, and εi is the 
error term. The results of the regressions are reported in the following section. In the 
multivariate analysis we control for a variety of firm and deal specific variables that are 
known to influence merger success (see table 3). Acquirer profitability and research and 
development spending is associated with higher acquisition returns in some studies whereas 
size and cash holdings have been found to influence abnormal returns negatively. Targets 
in the same industry as the acquirer and consideration payment in cash may lead to higher 
returns; deals that are either hostile or competed have been found to influence results in 
both ways. Relatively larger targets often yield better results, as do private targets.  
We also control for ‘economic freedom index’ (EC Free) per country. This index measures 
the extent of property rights and the prevalence of markets (see Gwartney et al. 2006 for a 
detailed description). We also control for targets’ countries relative growth rates (Growth) 
since expanding into markets with faster growth might signal higher future growth. We 
measure relative target market growth as the differential between the GDP growth of the 
target country and the German GDP growth in the year of the acquisition announcement. 
We finally control for relative currency strength (Currency). Kang (1993) finds significant 
influence of exchange rates to bidder returns of Japanese firms acquiring US-targets. A 
strong acquirer currency relative to the target country currency may provide advantages to 
bidder firms against rival bidders and reduce the relative cost of the bid. Other researchers, 
e.g. Eun et al. (1996), have found currency strength to be insignificant. We measure 
currency strength in the same way as Kang (1993), using nominal exchange rates obtained 
from the International Monetary Fund. The variable currency strength is equal to the 
difference between the average exchange rate in the year of the deal announcement and the   9
average exchange rate between 1985 and 2006 divided by the average exchange rate 
between 1985 and 2006. All exchange rates are measured as the ratio of foreign currency to 
Deutsche Mark (DM). A positive variable indicates a strong DM and a negative variable a 
weak DM with respect to the currency of the target country. To adjust for the introduction 
of the EUR in 1999, the DM values for the years 1999-2006 were calculated using the 
official conversion rates from the European Central Bank. Consequently, the exchange 
rates between Germany and the EUR member states after 1999 are constant. Furthermore 
we analyze whether different world regions (US, Western Europe, the ‘rest of world’) and a 
common border to Germany influence the results. 
Table 3: Regression variables
 
Variable Definition
AC SIZE Acquirer size: measured as the natural logarithm of the bidder's enterprise value in the 
business year prior to the announcement.
AC PROF Acquirer profitability: measured as bidder EBITDA divided by bidder sales in the 
business year prior to the announcement.
AC CASH Acquirer cash: measured as bidder cash and cash equivalents divided by bidder total 
assets in the business year prior to the announcement.
AC R&D Acquirer R&D spending: measured as the acquirer's R&D expenses divided by sales in 
the business year prior to the announcement.
RELATED Relatedness: a dummy variable that is one if the acquisition is related and zero otherwise. 
An acquisitions is labelled "related" if the acquirer and the target share the first two 
digits of their primary SIC code and if manual screening does not lead to different 
results. 
CASH Cash payment: a dummy variable that is one if the acquirer pays cash and zero 
otherwise.
HOSTILE Hostile acquisition: a dummy variable that is one if the acquisition is hostile and zero 
otherwise.
COMPETED Competing bidders: a dummy variable that is one if a bidding contest emerged and zero 
otherwise.
REL SIZE Relative size: measured as deal size / enterprise value of the acquirer one business year 
before the announcement.
PUBLIC A dummy variable that is one if the target is public and zero otherwise.
EC FREE Economic freedom of the target country: measured with the Economic Freedom of the 
World Index of the Fraser Institute.
BORDER Direct border target country: a dummy variable that is one if the target country has a 
direct border with Germany and zero otherwise.
USA US-target: a dummy variable that is one if the target is a US-American firm and zero 
otherwise.
EUROPE European target: a dummy variable that is one if the target is a Western European 
(except Germany) company and zero otherwise.
ROW Rest of world target: a dummy variable that is one if the target is not a US-American or a 
European target and zero otherwise.
GROWTH Relative target market growth: measured as the difference between the target market 
GDP growth and the German GDP growth in the year of the announcement.
CURRENCY Currency strength: adjusted for EUR conversion and measured as (exchange rate in the 
year of announcement - average exchange rate 1985-2006) / average exchange rate 1985-
2006. 
   10
Finally, we also insert a ‘bubble years’-  dummy that is one in the years 1999-2001 
and zero otherwise to control for special circumstances – i.e., especially bad returns – 
during the bubble without the results changing qualitatively (not reported).  
 
4  Results and discussion 
4.1  Univariate analysis 
To evaluate the magnitude and significance of abnormal returns to acquirers in domestic 
and international acquisitions we use different event windows. Panel A of table 4 displays 
the results of two tailed t-tests for the entire sample of N=155 acquisitions. Acquirer 
returns are insignificant in most event windows, except for the event window [-1; +20], 
where acquirer returns are negatively significant on a 10% level. These results suggest that 
there is no clear direction for announcement returns in a mixed sample including both 
cross-border and domestic acquisitions. 
Table 4: Significance tests 
Event window 
(days)
Average 
CAR
T-value Positive 
CARs 
Negative 
CARs
A. Full sample (n = 155)
[-20;20] -1,469% -1.208 66 89
[-5;5] -0,481% -0.718 73 82
[-1;1] 0,344% 0.896 80 75
[-1;20] -1,273% ** -1.685 71 84
B. Domestic acquisitions (n = 40)
[-20;20] 0,658% 0.352 21 19
[-5;5] -0,382% -0.400 17 23
[-1;1] 1,198% * 1.574 24 16
[-1;20] 0,340% 0.251 19 21
C. Cross-border acquisitions (n = 115)
[-20;20] -2,208% * -1.471 45 70
[-5;5] -0,516% -0.613 56 59
[-1;1] 0,047% 0.107 56 59
[-1;20] -1,834% *** -2.036 52 63
***, **, * denote significance on a 5%, 10%, 15% level, respectively
   11
The results  for  the domestic and the   cross-border  sub-samples  vary  considerably. 
Panel B of table 4 reports the results for the domestic sample and Panel C for the cross-
border sample. The abnormal returns for domestic acquisitions are generally insignificant 
or positively significant on a 15% level over the various event windows, which is in line 
with the literature. The only event window with a negative (but insignificant) CAR for the 
domestic sample is [-5; +5] with a relatively small negative return. Together, these results 
provide evidence that domestic acquisitions do not destroy value for acquiring firms’ 
shareholders. In contrast, abnormal returns for cross-border acquisitions shown in panel C 
are either negatively significant or insignificant. The event window [-1; +20] leads to an 
average CAR of -1.8% for cross-border acquirers, which is significant on a 5% level. This 
result is supported by an average CAR of -2.2% in the largest event window [-20; +20], 
significant on a 15% level. The event windows whose average CARs are positive are in no 
case close to conventional significance levels. This is in contrast to Moeller and 
Schlingemann (2005) who find positive though insignificant returns within a [-1; +1] 
window for cross-border acquisitions in the US. Our results, however, do indicate that 
there are systematic differences between domestic and cross-border acquisitions, now 
similar to Moeller and Schlingemann (2005).  
We plot the abnormal returns of domestic and cross-border transactions in Graph 2: 
whereas the domestic acquirers build up a small positive cumulated abnormal return of 
0.7% over the event window [-20; +20], the cross-border acquisitions accumulate a 
negative abnormal return of -2.2% over the same period. Moreover, the cross-border CAR 
stays negative throughout the entire period whereas the domestic CAR remains mostly 
positive. The shareholders of domestic acquirers experience the biggest gains in a short 
period around the announcement. After a downward correction in the succeeding days, the 
CAR rises again. In contrast, the shareholders of cross-border acquirers experience losses 
previous to the announcement and a slight recovery around the announcement date.    12
 
Graph 2: Cumulated abnormal returns for acquirers in domestic and cross-border deals 
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A two-tailed, two sample t-test rejects the null hypothesis that the means of the domestic 
and the cross-border sample are significantly different from each other on up to an error 
probability of 0.191 (see table 5). We run some non-parametric tests to test the robustness 
of the results. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test examines whether the domestic and the 
cross-border samples follow the same distribution. The Mann-Whitney test (also called 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney or Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test) detects location differences 
between the two samples based on their mean. The results of these tests do not differ from 
the results of the parametric tests and are not reported here.  
Table 5: Two sample t-tests, domestic vs. cross border acquisitions, two-tailed
Event window 
(days)
Number of 
observations
Domestic 
average CAR
Cross border 
average CAR
T-value P-value
[-20;20] 155 0,658% -2,208% 1,195 0,235
[-20;10] 155 0,761% -0,682% 0,680 0,498
[-10;20] 155 0,433% -1,221% 0,842 0,402
[-5;5] 155 -0,382% -0,516% 0,105 0,916
[-1;20] 155 0,340% -1,834% 1,261 0,209
[-20;1] 155 1,517% -0,327% 1,016 0,312
[-10;1] 155 1,292% 0,660% 0,489 0,625
[-5;1] 155 1,206% 0,297% 0,875 0,384
[-1;1] 155 1,198% 0,047% 1,313 0,191
 
The difference between the two samples is not large enough to conclude that there are 
systematic differences between the announcement returns of domestic and cross-border 
acquirers. The sample also contains only little evidence indicating that domestic acquirers 
perform better than cross-border acquirers. Using a one-tailed t-test leads to significant   13
results on a 15% level for the [-20; +20]  window and on a 10% level for the [-1; +1] 
window (the respective P-values are just divided by two to receive the results). This 
supports the view that domestic deals lead to larger gains for shareholders and that the 
costs of international diversification may actually outweigh its advantages.  
Summarizing the findings in this section so far, domestic acquisitions seem to perform 
better for shareholders than cross-border acquisitions. This difference, however, is 
statistically insignificant on conventional levels except for the one-tailed tests. The 
comparatively small sample of German domestic and international transactions might be 
one reason for that. Other than Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) for US firms we do not 
find unambiguously negative cross-border effects for German acquirers. We check whether 
the abnormal announcement returns differ between target regions (table 6). Therefore we 
distinguish between target countries that have a common border with Germany (Border), 
Western European countries (Europe), US-targets (USA) and the rest of the world (ROW).  
Table 6: Average CARs of cross-border acquisitions 
          event window
[-20; +20] [-5; +5] [-1; +1] [-1; +20] n
Europe 1.09% 1.61% 0.18% 0.06% 52
    thereof: Border 6.54% 3.71%* 1.23% 1.19% 22
Non-bordering -4.38%**** -1.52%** -0.23% -2.72%**** 93
USA -4.42%*** -2.40%** -0.15% -2.77%*** 55
ROW -8.42%* -1.38% 0.54% -7.71%** 8
****, ***, **, * denote significance on a 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% level, respectively  
 
Acquisitions in countries that share a border with Germany (Border) deliver the best 
though insignificant results with an average abnormal return of +6.54% in the largest 
window. Targets in all Western European countries, including those that have a common 
border with Germany, do not deliver results that are distinguishable from zero on average. 
When we group together all target countries that do not share a common border with 
Germany (Non-border) the average abnormal return reaches a highly significant -4.38%. 
Bordering and non-bordering target nations deliver significantly different results from each 
other on a 1% level (t-value of 2.92), and also the median values of the two groups are 
significantly different from each other (not reported). Distance from Germany clearly 
seems to matter for acquisition success. Surprisingly, even acquisitions in the US yield a 
significantly negative average abnormal return up to -4.4% in the largest window; within a 
[-1; +20] day window the figure is -2.7%, significant on a 5% level. Deals with the ‘rest of   14
the world’ are negative and significant on a  10% level in the [-1; +20] window. These 
findings are in line with Grote and Umber (2007) who show that within the US domestic 
transactions with targets that are far away deliver the worst results, targets at a medium 
range (about 500 kilometres) the best and deals with targets located closer to the acquirer’s 
headquarter deliver mediocre results.  
 
4.2  Multivariate regressions  
We perform several multivariate OLS regression analyses to test whether the different 
abnormal returns per region hold when we control for firm and deal characteristics. The 
dependent variable in each of the regressions is the CAR for the event window [-20; +20] 
days around the announcement date. Table 6 above shows that the average abnormal 
returns get larger the longer the time covered by the event windows; at the same time the 
results actually become more significant. There are several possible reasons for this: The 
announcement dates recorded in the database might not adequately reflect the date when 
capital market participants first learn about the deals. International deals usually involve 
more people than domestic ones so the probability of leakages is higher. Other deal-related 
news such as competition in bids or reactions to hostile offers might occur close to the 
announcement date and influence the acquirers’ share prices. Finally, European regulations 
on insider trading and announcements have not been as strict as in the US until recently. 
The increasing statistical significance signals that it is not unrelated firm events that distort 
the findings. We run the regression also on other CAR windows; the results do not change 
qualitatively but lose significance. All regressions reported below are statistically significant 
on a 1% level; the adjusted R
2 of the cross-border regressions runs up to 15% which is 
about the same as in other studies (e.g., Morck and Yeung 1992; Harris and Ravenscraft 
1991; and Markides and Ittner 1994). We analyse the residuals to check whether any 
conditions for the OLS regressions are violated. A White (1980) test shows that there are 
no problems arising from heteroskedasticity. The Shapiro-Wilk, Anderson-Darling, 
Lilliefors and Jarque-Bera tests all accept the null hypothesis that the residuals are normally 
distributed (not reported).  
We start by regressing variables reported in the literature to influence abnormal returns on 
our full sample with both, domestic and cross-border deals (column 1 in table 7). With an 
adjusted R² of 9.7% the model is reasonably well specified. As expected, acquirer size (AC 
Size) is negatively significant and acquirer profitability (AC Prof) is positively significant – 
the latter in contrast to Lang et al. (1991). On average, smaller and better managed firms 
yield higher abnormal returns in acquisitions. Somewhat surprising, not many of the ‘usual 
suspects’ yield significant coefficients: acquirer’s cash (AC Cash) and R&D spending (AC 
R&D), the target’s relative size to the acquirer (Rel Size), whether the transaction is paid for 
in cash or not (Cash), whether the target is in related business (Related) or the deal is   15
hostile (Hostile) – none of these firm and  deal characteristics are significant in the full 
sample. When the target is a listed firm (Public), the results get worse, in line with the 
literature. Competed deals yield significantly better results than others. This is in contrast to 
Bradley et al. (1988); we should, however, interpret this finding carefully given that there 
are only five competed deals in the sample. Cash holdings of the acquirer become 
negatively significant when we run the regression on other event windows, supporting the 
free cash flow hypothesis of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986). In some 
windows we find the relative size of the target with respect to the acquirer getting 
significantly positive, as found by Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), Asquith et al. (1983), and 
others.  
Next we introduce two dummy variables, Domestic and Border, to test for border effects. 
Domestic is one in domestic deals and zero otherwise, and Border is one when the target is 
in a country that has a common border with Germany and zero otherwise (table 7, column 
II). The dummy for domestic deals is insignificant, confirming the results from the 
univariate analyses that abnormal returns are not significantly different in domestic and 
international deals. We repeat this analysis for all event windows, with the domestic dummy 
never getting significant. The border dummy is significant at the 1%-level: Buying firms in 
neighbouring countries delivers significantly positive results also when we control for a 
wealth of firm and deal characteristics. This is remarkable: Neither domestic deals nor 
international deals far away deliver superior results – but deals in nearby countries do.   16
Table 7: Multivariate regression results on average CARs of German bidders, [-20; +20] event window
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
Intercept 0.381*** 0.358*** 0.402*** 0.391*** 0.382
(2,43) (2,31) (2,56) (2,53) (1,23)
AC SIZE -0.028**** -0.028**** -0.029**** -0.029**** -0.02*
(-2,85) (-2,89) (-2,95) (-2,96) (-1,64)
AC PROF 0.251**** 0.245**** 0.246*** 0.246**** 0.286****
(2,64) (2,62) (2,59) (2,63) (2,79)
AC CASH 0.048 0.043 0.018 0.035 0.094
(0,37) (0,33) (0,13) (0,27) (0,60)
AC R&D 0.074 0.18 0.134 0.12 0.052
(0,25) (0,61) (0,44) (0,40) (0,15)
RELATED 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.001
(0,59) (0,64) (0,64) (0,63) (0,02)
CASH -0.001 -0.005 0.004 -0.001 -0.006
(-0,05) (-0,19) (0,15) (-0,05) (-0,18)
HOSTILE 0.107 0.121 0.107 0.114 0.079
(1,23) (1,40) (1,23) (1,32) (0,84)
COMPETED 0.118** 0.089 0.107* 0.091 0.16**
(1,75) (1,33) (1,60) (1,37) (1,70)
RELSIZE -0.001 -0.008 -0.005 -0.007 -0.003
(-0,07) (-0,41) (-0,25) (-0,39) (-0,13)
PUBLIC -0.051** -0.041* -0.05** -0.048** -0.042
(-1,86) (-1,49) (-1,79) (-1,76) (-1,28)
DOMESTIC 0.034
(1,17)
BORDER 0.091**** 0.073*** 0.071*
(2,63) (2,10) (1,58)
EUROPE 0.013
(0,41)
USA -0.024 -0.015 0.019
(-0,75) (-0,55) (0,47)
ROW -0.089* -0.089** -0.119**
(-1,60) (-1,69) (-1,80)
ECFREE -0.018
(-0,52)
GROWTH -0.376
(-0,59)
CURRENCY 0.224***
(2,05)
n 155 155 155 155 115
R
2 0,155 0,195 0,180 0,204 0,272
adj. R
2 0,097 0,127 0,105 0,131 0,153
Prob (F-Stat) 0,005 0,001 0,006 0,001 0,007
****, ***, **, * denote significance on a 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% level, respectively.
 
We introduce dummies for different target regions in column III. International deals can 
take place either in the US (USA), in Western Europe (Europe) or in the rest of the world 
(ROW). Since neighbouring countries overlap to a great extent with Western European 
countries we cannot test both groups in one regression. Neither targets in Western Europe 
nor in the US deliver significant abnormal returns for acquirers. Our results for the US are 
in line with the findings of Eun et al. (1996) who get insignificant acquirer CARs for 
French, German and Dutch firms that buy US-targets. The coefficient for ROW is negative 
but only on a 15% level. When we exchange the Europe-dummy with the Border-dummy   17
in  column  IV,  the  ROW-dummy  gets  significant on a 10% level. Again, Border is 
significant at a 5% level.  
In Model V we introduce foreign country variables which reduce our sample to 
international deals only (n=115). We find the economic freedom index to be insignificant – 
given that most of the targets are located in highly developed countries this is no surprise. 
Growth rate differentials between Germany and the target countries are negative but 
insignificant; the coefficient gets significant for other event windows, though: The market 
does at least not seem to welcome the entry in high growth areas. The currency variable is 
significantly positive; supporting the hypothesis that acquirers have advantages in times of 
relative currency strength (Kang 1993): With a highly valued DM (Euro) transactions 
deliver significantly better returns. The country-specific variables bear some explanatory 
power for the abnormal returns of acquiring firms; their introduction increases the adjusted 
R² to more than 15%. The coefficient for the border-variable looses some of its 
significance – it is now significant at an 11.6% level – but remains a fairly constant positive 
influence on acquirer returns. 
Of interests here are also the research and development expenses of the acquirer (AC 
R&D) – these are insignificant throughout the different specifications. This result casts 
some doubt on the internalization hypothesis discussed in section 2. If internalization was 
the motive for international diversification and companies tried to employ their firm-
specific resources and comparative advantages on larger and international scale, the 
variable would have to be positive and significant at least on lower levels. Although 
companies that acquire abroad clearly spend more of their resources on research and 
development (see Table 2) and consequently rely more on intangible assets than their 
competitors with lower R&D intensity, there is no correlation with their announcement 
returns. In general, our results contradict the theoretical explanation for corporate 
international diversification presented in section 2. If companies provided geographical 
diversification opportunities to investors which those cannot achieve on their own, this 
service should be especially valuable for areas where information asymmetries are high and 
direct investment by individuals is therefore limited, i.e., the countries that are included in 
the ROW group. This is clearly not the case. Moreover, the results are not compatible with 
the framework of multinational networks, which implies that the market value of 
companies increases with their degree of international diversification. If this was the case 
abnormal returns of the acquiring companies would, on average, have to be positive for the 
entire sample of cross-border acquisitions. Acquisitions in countries with a common 
border, i.e. at low geographic and presumably cultural differences consistently deliver the 
best results.  
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5  Conclusion 
The paper examines shareholder wealth effects of international acquisitions. We use a 
sample of 155 acquisitions by German corporations in the period from 1985-2006 and 
focus on short term abnormal announcement returns to acquiring firms. We find that, for 
different event windows, announcement returns for domestic acquisitions are either 
positively significant or insignificant. In contrast, announcement returns for international 
acquisitions are either negatively significant or insignificant. Two sample tests, however, 
find the difference between the two groups not statistically significant. Nevertheless, 
international acquisitions at least do not perform better than domestic acquisitions and on 
average destroy shareholder value. We then divide our sample of cross-border transactions 
into regions to analyse whether geography makes a difference. We find that acquisitions 
within Western Europe also do not deliver results that are distinguishable from zero on 
average. Surprisingly, transactions in countries with a common border to Germany deliver 
the best results with positive – though insignificantly different from zero – abnormal 
returns of +6.5% for the acquiring firms in a [-20; +20] day window. In contrast, 
acquisitions of targets in countries that have no common border with Germany result in 
highly significant -4.4% abnormal returns; the two results are significantly different from 
each other. Acquisitions in the US yield significantly negative average abnormal returns of 
-4.4% and deals with the ‘rest of the world’ also deliver negative average returns of -8.4% 
of the acquirers’ stock. Whereas the results for the US get insignificant when we control for 
a variety of firm and deal characteristics, acquisitions in neighbouring countries continue to 
produce significantly positive and deals with the rest of the world significantly negative 
abnormal returns. Our results are not driven by specific circumstances during the ‘bubble-
years’ 1999–2001.  
We find that acquirer profitability has a positive impact and acquirer size has a negative 
impact on announcement returns. In most specifications, acquiring a listed target instead of 
a private one lowers the abnormal returns. A strong currency significantly improves the 
results in our sample. Overall, not many of the ‘usual suspects’ from the literature drive the 
abnormal returns of German acquirers. The acquirers’ cash holdings, whether the deal is 
paid for in cash or not and the acquirers’ research and development expenditures are 
insignificant in most event windows for our sample. Thus, results derived from 
observations in the US should not unequivocally be transferred to other regions. 
Considering our results it is not surprising that different studies on cross-border 
acquisitions – focussing on different acquirer and target countries – lead to different 
results. Especially the studies that do not differentiate between target countries ignore the 
possibility that returns to acquirer firms may differ systematically according to targets’ 
regions or geographic distances to the acquirer.  
Our results do not provide support for any prevailing theories about the benefits of 
corporate international diversification; the insignificance of the R&D variable in the   19
regressions shows that internalization might not be a consistent motivation for 
international acquisitions. Rather, our analysis provides evidence that announcement 
returns differ systematically according to the geographical location of the target firm. 
Proximity is one of the most important success factors in cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions. This might have several causes: The integration of targets and the realisation 
of synergies are arguably more difficult with larger distances between two firms. 
Knowledge of each other’s language and culture might be an advantage; also more ‘soft’ 
information is available for closer targets. Lastly, firms closer by can be monitored more 
easily. The question then arises, why not the closest firms, i.e., the domestic targets, lead to 
the most successful deals. More research on the differences between domestic and cross-
border deals that incorporates geographical variables is needed. Notwithstanding, our core 
findings – cross-border acquisitions in neighbouring countries yield significantly, 
consistently and economically relevantly better results than acquisitions farther away – 
could be a valuable guideline for management teams and investors alike.  
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